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Abstract
This paper takes as a starting point a recent development in privacy-debates: the emphasis on social and institutional environ-
ments in the definition and the defence of privacy. Recognizing the merits of this approach I supplement it in two respects. 
First, an analysis of the relation between privacy and autonomy teaches that in the digital age more than ever individual 
autonomy is threatened. The striking contrast between on the one hand offline vocabulary, where autonomy and individual 
decision making prevail, and on the other online practices is a challenge that cannot be met in a social approach. Secondly, I 
elucidate the background of the social approach. Its importance is not exclusively related to the digital age. In public life we 
regularly face privacy-moments, when in a small distinguished social domain few people are commonly involved in common 
experiences. In the digital age the contextual integrity model of Helen Nissenbaum has become very influential. However 
this model has some problems. Nissenbaum refers to a variety of sources and uses several terms to explain the normativity in 
her model. The notion ‘context’ is not specific and faces the reproach of conservatism. We elaborate on the most promising 
suggestion: an elaboration on the notion ‘goods’ as it can be found in the works of Michael Walzer and Alisdair Macintyre. 
Developing criteria for defining a normative framework requires making explicit the substantive goods that are at stake in a 
context, and take them as the starting point for decisions about the flow of information. Doing so delivers stronger and more 
specific orientations that are indispensible in discussions about digital privacy.
Keywords Privacy · Autonomy · Contextual integrity · Nissenbaum
Introduction
Rethinking the concept of privacy in the digital age inevi-
tably entangles the descriptive and the normative dimen-
sions of this concept. Theoretically these two dimensions of 
privacy can be distinguished. One dimension can describe 
the degree of privacy people enjoy, without taking a norma-
tive stance about the desirable degree of privacy. In norma-
tive discussions, the focus is on the reasons why privacy is 
important for leading a fulfilling life. This distinction should 
not distract us from the fact that privacy is not a completely 
neutral concept; instead, it has a positive connotation. For 
example, an invasion of privacy is a violation of or intru-
sion into something valuable that should be protected. Dis-
cussion of the concept, however, brings into question why 
privacy should be cherished and protected. In the digital 
age, the normative dimension is the object of intense dis-
cussion. Existing dangers to privacy—because of big data 
applications, cloud computing, and profiling—are widely 
recognized, but feelings of resignation and why should we 
bother lie dormant. Defenders of privacy are regularly faced 
with scepticism, which is fueled by Schmidt’s ‘Innocent peo-
ple have nothing to hide’ (Esguerra 2009) and Zuckerberg’s 
‘Having two identities for yourself is a lack of integrity’ 
(Boyd 2014).
Traditionally in defences of privacy the focus has been on 
the individual (Rule 2015). Privacy was defined in terms of an 
individual’s space, which was seen as necessary for meeting 
the individual’s vital interests. In the last decade, however, 
we have seen a shift in the emphasis. A view of privacy as 
the norm that regulates and structures social life (the social 
dimension of privacy) has gained importance in both law and 
philosophical literature. For instance, the European Court of 
Human Rights previously stressed that data protection was an 
individual’s right not to be interfered with. However, more and 
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more the Court is focusing on individuals’ privacy as protec-
tion of their relationships with other human beings (van der 
Sloot 2014). In philosophical literature on privacy, many schol-
ars have explicitly distanced themselves from the individual 
approach and instead study the social dimensions of privacy 
(Roessler and Mokrosinska 2015). Helen Nissenbaum is by 
far the most important spokesperson for the social approach. 
She has introduced the notion of contextual integrity as an 
alternative to what she describes as too much focus on indi-
viduals’ rights based notions of privacy (Nissenbaum 2009). 
Nissenbaum criticizes the so-called interest-based approach, 
which defines conflicts in terms of (violated) interests of the 
parties involved. For instance, ‘Uncontroversial acceptance of 
healthcare monitoring systems can be explained by pointing 
to the roughly even service to the interest of patients, hospi-
tals, healthcare professionals and so on’. The problem with 
this approach, according to Nissenbaum, is that it sooner or 
later leads to ‘hard fought interest brawls’, which more often 
than not are settled to the advantage of the more powerful 
parties (Nissenbaum 2009, p. 8). It is necessary to create a 
justificatory platform to reason in moral terms. As a rights-
based approach is not satisfactory, she proposes a normative 
approach that does more justice to the social dimension.
The distinction between a focus on the individual and pri-
vacy as social value is not only of academic importance. For 
policies on privacy, this makes quite a difference. On the one 
hand, the emphasis can be on an individual’s right to decide 
about personal interests and transparency for empowering 
the individual, as for instance the European Data Protec-
tion Supervisor asserts (EDPS Opinion 2015). On the other 
hand, the emphasis can also be on institutional arrangements 
that protect social relationships. The fact that good privacy 
policies require measures should not be a reason to overlook 
their fundamental differences.
In this paper, we compare individual-based justifications 
of privacy with the social approach. We open with a discus-
sion of the strengths of the individual-focused approach by 
relating privacy to a concept that has a strong normative 
sense and is most closely associated with individual-based 
privacy conceptions: autonomy. As we will see, a defence 
of privacy along these lines is both possible and necessary. 
In our discussion of the social approach, we focus on Helen 
Nissenbaum’s model. A critical discussion of the norma-
tive dimension will lead to suggestions for strengthening 
this model.
The individual approach
The importance of privacy: autonomy
The history of justifications of privacy starts with Warren 
and Brandeis’s (1890) legal definition of privacy as the 
right to be left alone (1890). This classic definition is com-
pletely in line with the literal meaning of privacy. The word 
is a negativum (related to deprive) of public. The right to 
privacy is essentially the right of individuals to have their 
own domain, separated from the public (Solove 2015). The 
basic way to describe this right to be left alone is in terms 
of access to a person. In classic articles, Gavison and Rei-
man characterize privacy as the degree of access that others 
have to you through information, attendance, and proximity 
(Gavison 1984; Reiman 1984).
Discussion about the importance of privacy for the indi-
vidual intensified in the second half of the twentieth century, 
as patterns of living in societies became more and more indi-
vidualistic. Privacy became linked to the valued notion of 
autonomy and the underlying idea of individual freedom. In 
both literature on privacy and judicial statements, this con-
nection between privacy and autonomy has been a topic of 
intense discussion. Sometimes the two concepts were even 
blended together, even though they should remain distinct. 
A sharp distinction between privacy and autonomy is neces-
sary to get to grips with the normative dimension of privacy.
The concept autonomy is derived from the ancient Greek 
words autos (self) and nomos (law). Especially within the 
Kantian framework, the concept is explicated in terms of 
a rational individual who, reflecting independently, takes 
his own decisions. Being autonomous was thus understood 
mainly as having control over one’s own life. In many 
domains of professional ethics (healthcare, consumer pro-
tection, and scientific research), autonomy is a key concept 
in defining how human beings should be treated. The right 
of individuals to control their own life should always be 
respected. The patient, the consumer, and the research par-
ticipant each must be able to make his or her own choices 
(Strandburg 2014). Physicians are supposed to fully inform 
patients; advertisers who are caught lying are censured; and 
informed consent is a standard requirement of research eth-
ics. In each of these cases, persons should not be forced, 
tempted, or seduced into performing actions they do not 
want to do.
When privacy and autonomy are connected, privacy is 
described as a way of controlling one’s own personal envi-
ronment. An invasion of privacy disturbs control over (or 
access to) one’s personal sphere. This notion of privacy is 
closely related to secrecy. A person who deliberately gains 
access to information that the other person wants to keep 
secret is violating the other person’s autonomy through 
information control. We see the emphasis on privacy as con-
trol over information in, for instance, Marmor’s description 
of privacy as ‘grounded in people’s interest in having a rea-
sonable measure of control over the ways in which they can 
present themselves to others’ (Marmor 2015). Autonomy, 
however, does not entail an exhaustive description of pri-
vacy. It is possible that someone could have the ability to 
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control, yet he or she lacks privacy. For instance, a woman 
who frequently absentmindedly forgets to close the curtains 
before she undresses enables her neighbour to watch her. 
If the neighbour does so, we can speak about a loss of the 
woman’s privacy. Nevertheless, the woman still has the abil-
ity to control. At any moment, she could choose to close the 
curtains. Thus, privacy requires more than just autonomy.
The distinction between privacy and autonomy becomes 
clearer in Judith Jarvis Thompson’s classic thought experi-
ment (Taylor 2002). Imagine that my neighbour invented 
some elaborate X-ray device that enabled him to look 
through the walls. I would thereby lose control over who 
can look at me, but my privacy would not be violated until 
my neighbour actually started to look through the walls. It 
is the actual looking that violates privacy, not the acquisi-
tion of the power to look. If my neighbour starts observing 
through the walls but I’m not aware of it and believe that I 
am carrying out my duties in the privacy of my own home, 
my autonomy would not be directly undermined. Not only in 
thought experiments, but also in literature and everyday life, 
we witness the difference between autonomy and privacy. 
Taylor refers to Scrooge in Dickens’ A Christmas Carol who 
is present as a ghost at family parties. His covert observa-
tion of the intimate Christmas dinner party implies a breach 
of privacy, although he does not influence the behaviour 
of the other people. In everyday life, we do not experience 
an inadvertent breach of privacy (for instance, a passer by 
randomly picking up some information) as loss of autonomy.
These examples make it clear that there is a difference 
between autonomy, which is about control, and privacy, 
which is about knowledge and access to information. The 
most natural way to connect the two concepts is to con-
sider privacy as a tool that fosters and encourages auton-
omy. Privacy thus understood contributes to demarcation 
of a personal sphere, which makes it easier for a person to 
make decisions independently of other people. But a loss of 
privacy does not automatically imply loss of autonomy. A 
violation of privacy will result in autonomy being under-
mined only when at least one additional condition is met: 
the observing (privacy-violating) person is in one way or 
another influencing the other person (Taylor 2002). Such a 
violation of privacy can take various forms. For instance, the 
person involved might feel pressure to alter her behaviour 
just because she knows she is being observed. Or a person 
who is not aware of being observed is being manipulated. 
This, in fact, occurs more than ever before in the digital age.
Loss of autonomy in the digital age
In the more than 100 years following Warren and Brandeis’ 
publication of their definition, privacy was mainly consid-
ered to be a spatial notion. For example, the right to be left 
alone was the right to have one’s own space in a territorial 
sense, e.g., at home behind closed curtains, where other peo-
ple were not allowed. An important topic in discussions of 
privacy was the embarrassment experienced when someone 
else entered the private spatial domain. Consider, for exam-
ple, public figures whose privacy is invaded by obtrusive 
photographers or people who feel invaded when someone 
unexpectedly enters their home (Roessler 2009; Gavison 
1984).
The digital age is characterized by the omnipresence of 
hidden cameras and other surveillance devices. This kind 
of observation and the corresponding embarrassment that it 
can cause have changed our ideas about privacy. The main 
concern is not the intrusive eye of another person, but the 
constant observation, which can lead to the panopticon expe-
rience of the interiorized gaze of the other. It is self-evident 
that the additional conditions are now being met, viz., the 
person’s autonomy is threatened. In situations in which 
the observed person feels impeded to follow his impulses 
(Van Otterloo 2014), the loss of privacy leads to diminished 
autonomy.
The loss of autonomy resulting from persistent sur-
veillance becomes even more striking when we take into 
consideration the unprecedented collection and storage of 
non-visual information. Collecting data on individuals, 
such as through the activity of profiling, offers commer-
cial parties and other institutions endless possibilities for 
approaching people in ways that meet the institution’s own 
interests. Driven by invisible algorithms, these institutions 
temp, nudge, seduce, and convince individuals to partici-
pate for reasons that are advantageous to the institution. The 
widespread application of algorithms in decision-making 
processes intensifies the problem of loss of autonomy in at 
least two respects. First, when algorithms are used to track 
people’s behaviour, there is no ‘observer’ in the strict sense 
of the word; no human (or other ‘cognitive entity’) actually 
ever checks the individual’s search profile. Nevertheless, the 
invisibility of the watchful entity does not diminish the pre-
cision with which the behaviour is being tracked; in fact, it 
is quite the opposite. Second, in the digital age mere aware-
ness of the possibility that surveillance techniques exist has 
an impact on human behaviour, independently of whether 
there is actually an observing entity. More than ever before, 
Foucault’s (1975) addition to Bentham’s panopticon model 
is relevant. The gaze of the other person is internalized.
This brings us to the conclusion that, despite the fact 
that a loss of privacy does not necessarily involve a loss of 
autonomy, in the digital age when privacy is under threat, 
the independence of individual decisions is typically also 
compromised.
These observations are striking when we consider that 
Western societies in particular focus on the individual 
person, whose autonomy is esteemed very highly. We can 
contrast the self-image and ego vocabulary that prevail in 
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everyday life with online situations where an individual’s 
autonomy is lost. There are two examples of this from 
domains where autonomy has traditionally been considered 
to be very important and where it has come under threat.
Advertising
In consumer and advertising ethics, the consumer’s free 
choice is the moral cornerstone. In the online world, this 
ethical value is scarcely met. Digitalisation facilitates cus-
tomised advertising, which originally was presented as a 
service for the individual. Tailored information was sup-
posed to strengthen a person’s capacities to make choices 
to his own advantage. But now the procedure has become 
degenerated; people are placed into a filter bubble based on 
algorithms and corporate policies that are unknown to the 
target persons. Individuals’ control and knowledge about the 
flow of information are lost. As we all are keenly aware, 
requiring people to agree with terms and conditions does 
nothing to solve the problem. In the first place, very few 
people even read them. This kind of autonomy is apparently 
too demanding for most people to exercise. Secondly, the 
terms and conditions do not themselves say anything about 
the algorithms. Today’s consumer finds himself in a grey 
area, where he struggles between exercising autonomy and 
being influenced by others.
Of course, it is an empirical question as to what degree 
the algorithms influence customers’ behaviour. The least we 
can say is that the wide application of algorithms suggests 
that they must have a substantial effect. Following the criti-
cal study of Sunstein (2009) in which he warns that the polit-
ical landscape might become fragmented (‘cyberbalkaniza-
tion’), much research has been undertaken on the influence 
of algorithms on political opinions. This has resulted in a 
nuanced view of the widespread existence of ‘confirma-
tion bias’. For instance, it has been shown that the need for 
information that confirms one’s opinion differs from other 
kinds of information and that it is stronger in those people 
who have more extreme political opinions. Furthermore, 
there turns out to be a major difference between how often 
individuals actively search for opinions similar to their own 
(what people usually do) and how often they consciously 
avoid noticing opinions that differ from their own (which 
are far more infrequent). People surfing the Internet often 
encounter news they were not consciously looking for, but 
which they nevertheless take seriously. This is called ‘inad-
vertent’ attention for news (Garret 2009; Tewksbury and 
Rittenberg 2009; Becker 2015, Chap. 4).
The question how online networks influence exposure to 
perspectives that cut across ideological lines received a lot 
of attention after the Brexit referendum and Trump elec-
tion. Using data of 10.1 million Facebook users Bakshy et al. 
confirm that digital technologies have the potential to limit 
exposure to attitude-challenging information. The authors 
observed substantial polarization among hard content shared 
by users, with the most frequently shared links clearly 
aligned with largely liberal or conservative populations. But 
one-sided algorithms are not always of decisive importance. 
The flow of information on Facebook is structured by how 
individuals are connected in the network. How much cross-
cutting content an individual encounters depends on who 
his friends are and what information those friends share. 
According to Bakshy et al. on average more than 20% of 
an individual’s Facebook friends who report an ideological 
affiliation are from the opposing party, leaving substantial 
room for exposure to opposing viewpoints (Bakshy et al. 
2015). Dubois and Blank, using a nationally representative 
survey of adult internet users in the UK found that individu-
als do tend to expose themselves to information and ideas 
they agree with. But they do not tend to avoid information 
and ideas that are conflicting. Particularly those who are 
interested in politics and those with diverse media diets tend 
to avoid echo chambers. Dubois & Blank observe that many 
studies are single platform studies, whereas most individuals 
use a variety of media in their news and political informa-
tion seeking practices. Measuring exposure to conflicting 
ideas on one platform does not account for the ways in with 
individuals collect information across the entire media envi-
ronment. Even individuals who have a strong partisan affili-
ation report using both general newssites which are largely 
non-partisan and include a variety of issues (Dubois and 
Blank 2018, see also Alcott et al.). These findings are con-
sistent with other studies that indicate that only a subset of 
Americans have heavily skewed media consumption patterns 
(Guess et al. 2016).
Research ethics
Corporations such as Google and Facebook, as well as data 
brokers use people’s personal information in their research 
activities. One disturbing example is the research that Face-
book conducted in 2014. The corporation experimented 
on hundreds of thousands of unwitting users, attempting 
to induce an emotional state in them by selectively show-
ing either positive or negative stories in their news feeds 
(Kramer et al. 2014; Fiske and Hauser 2014). Acquiring 
information by manipulating people without their informed 
consent and without debriefing them is a gross violation of 
the ethical standards that established research institutions 
must follow.
Such violations of people’s autonomy indicate a striking 
contrast between the offline ideals of most users and their 
online practices. Whereas in the offline world we typically 
take autonomy as a moral cornerstone, on the Internet this 
ideal is not upheld. How to deal with this discrepancy in 
values upheld in the real world and on the Internet is one of 
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the central challenges in discussions about privacy. When we 
do not strive for more clarity and transparency in the flow of 
information, we relinquish autonomy, a value that is deeply 
embedded in Western cultures.
The social approach
We might be tempted to associate the emergence of the 
social approach in discussions about privacy with the digi-
tal age, as if only in these times of rapid information flow 
reflection on the social dimension of privacy is justified. 
This, however, would be a false suggestion. During the twen-
tieth century, an important undercurrent in discussions of 
privacy was an emphasis on the importance of privacy for 
social relationships. Privacy was seen as a component of 
a well- functioning society (Regan 2015), in that it plays 
an important role in what is described as a differentiated 
society. Privacy guarantees social boundaries that help to 
maintain the variety of social environments. Because privacy 
provides contexts for people to develop in different kinds of 
relationships, respect for privacy enriches social life. Privacy 
also facilitates interactions among people along generally 
agreed patterns (Schoemann 1984). As the poet Robert Frost 
remarked in Mending Wall (1914), Good fences make good 
neighbors.
This characteristic of privacy is important not only at an 
institutional level. In people’s private lives the creation and 
maintenance of different kinds of relationships is possible 
only when subtle differences in patterns of social behav-
iour and social expectations are recognized (Rachels 1984, 
Marmor 2015). Remarkably, this subtlety becomes clearest 
in examples of intrusions of privacy in unoccupied public 
places. Consider (a) someone who deliberately attempts to 
sit beside lovers who are sitting together on a park bench, 
or (b) intrusive bystanders at the scene of a car accident. 
In both cases, the intrusions of the privacy of the persons 
involved are very important. The most trivial words and 
gestures can reflect a deep dedication and intense relation-
ship between two people. In one of the first descriptions 
of the core of privacy, the English jurist and philosopher 
Stephens depicted it as an observation which is sympathetic 
(Schoemann 1984). Sympathetic is derived from the Greek 
word sympathein, which means being involved with the 
same. Indeed, in private situations, different people experi-
ence the same things as important. A small, clearly distin-
guished domain is created, and the events should be shared 
only by those who directly participate in them. The persons 
involved are tied together by having undergone common 
experiences. They have an immediate relationship to what 
is at stake, and in this relationship they are deeply engrossed. 
An outside observer who has not participated in the common 
experience is viewed as invading their privacy. He cannot 
share the meaning of what is going on because he has not 
been directly involved.
When understood this way the concept of privacy is help-
ful in explaining the difference between occasionally being 
noticed and being eavesdropped upon. In cases involving 
eavesdropping, someone participates in an indirect and cor-
rupt way in what is going on. The participation is indirect 
because the person acquires knowledge without participat-
ing directly; the things that are at stake should not concern 
him. The participation is corrupt because the indirect par-
ticipant is not genuinely interested in what is going on. He 
sees the others involved not primarily as people with their 
own sensibilities, goals, and aspirations, but as the objects 
of his own curiosity. When the other people become aware 
that they are being observed, they begin to see themselves 
through the eyes of the observing person, and they thereby 
lose spontaneity. Their direct involvement in the meaning of 
what is at stake is lost.
In cases like these, neither the content of the action nor 
the secrecy surrounding it qualifies the actions as belonging 
to the private sphere. The content might be very trivial, but 
it would be offensive to the lovers sitting on the park bench 
to suggest that what they are expressing to each other could 
be made public. The most commonplace of actions—for 
instance, walking with one’s children down the street—can 
be private. Note the indignation of people in the public eye 
about obtrusive photographers who take photographs of pub-
lic figures while they are doing ordinary things like we all 
do. The essence of secrecy is intentional concealment, but 
the private situations that we discuss here concern behav-
iour, inward emotions, and convictions that can be shown 
and experienced in various places that are accessible to eve-
ryone, as for instance in the case of the young couple we saw 
sitting in the park (Belsey 1992).
This characteristic of privacy in social relationships can-
not be captured by the concept of autonomy in the sense of 
an individual independently and deliberately making his or 
her own choices. What is at stake in situations like these is 
not a lack of transparency. There is no question about the 
autonomy of an independent individual. The person would 
be deeply engrossed in precarious and delicate situations 
involving social relationships. An intrusion on this per-
son’s privacy would mean that he feels inhibited in being 
immersed in the social interaction and share the meaning 
at stake.
In order to do justice to this notion of privacy, other strat-
egies for protecting privacy are required. It is not primarily 
an individual’s mastery that must be protected; rather, it is 
the possibility for the individual to be properly embedded in 
social relationships. To answer the question of how this con-
cept of privacy manifests itself in the digital age, we turn to 
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Helen Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity model, which is an 
elaboration of socially embedded privacy in the digital age.
Helen Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity 
model
After having conducted several preliminary studies, Helen 
Nissenbaum published Privacy in Context (2009), a book 
that became very influential in philosophical and political 
debates on privacy. It inspired the Obama administration 
in the United States to focus on the principle of respect 
for context as an important notion in a document on the 
privacy of consumer data (Nissenbaum 2015). The core 
idea of Nissenbaum’s model is presented in the opening 
pages of her book: ‘What people care most about is not 
simply restricting the flow of information but ensuring that 
it flows appropriately.’ In Nissenbaum’s view, the notion 
‘appropriate’ can be understood to mean that normative 
standards are not determined by an abstract, theoretically 
developed default. The criteria for people’s actions and the 
expectations of the actions of other people are developed 
in the context of social structures that have evolved over 
time, and which are experienced in daily life. As examples 
of contexts, Nissenbaum mentions health care, education, 
religion, and family. The storage, monitoring, and tracking 
of data are allowed insofar as they serve the goals of the 
context. Privacy rules are characterized by an emphasis on 
data security and confidentiality, in order to ensure that the 
flow of information is limited only to the people directly 
involved. The key players in the context have the respon-
sibility to prevent the data from falling into the wrong 
hands.
Nissenbaum’s model is well-suited for the information 
age. It describes privacy in terms of the flow of infor-
mation, and the model is easy to apply to institutional 
gatekeepers who deal with data streams. At the same 
time, the contextual approach deviates from the classical 
view of autonomy. The personal control of information 
loses ground, and shared responsibility that is expressed 
through broader principles becomes more important. Nis-
senbaum considers it a serious disadvantage of the auton-
omy approach that it is usually associated with notions 
of privacy that are based on individuals’ rights. In the 
articulation of justificatory frameworks in policymaking 
and the legal arena, we often see major conflicts among 
parties who insist that their rights and interests should be 
protected. She also distances herself from the connection 
between privacy and secrecy (for a recent description of 
this connection, see Solove 2015). Privacy is not forfeited 
by the fact that someone knows something about another 
person. Within contexts, information about persons might 
flow relatively freely. In line with this, Nissenbaum puts 
into perspective the classic distinction between the private 
and the public realm. Contexts might transgress borders 
between the public and the private. For instance, profes-
sionals in social healthcare work with information that 
comes from intimate spheres. As professionals, they are, 
however, part of the public domain. It is their professional 
responsibility to deal properly with the flow of information 
within the realm of their own activities.
Normative weakness and the threat of conservatism
Nissenbaum’s rejection of autonomy as the basis for privacy 
raises questions about the normative strength of her model. 
Does she indeed deliver the justificatory platform or frame-
work to reason in moral terms? She asserts that her model 
does do so when she claims that the context procures a clear 
orientation, which can guide policies on privacy. This claim 
suggests that it is completely clear what a context is, as is 
the way in which it delivers a normative framework. In this 
respect, Nissenbaum’s work has some flaws.
In her description of context as a structured social set-
ting that guides behaviour, Nissenbaum refers to a wide 
array of scholars from social theory and philosophy. Nis-
senbaum (2009), for instance, reviews Bourdieu’s field 
theory, Schatzki’s notion of practice in which activities are 
structured teleologically, and Walzer’s Spheres of Justice. 
There are, however, major differences among these authors. 
Schatzki focuses on action theory and the way in which 
people develop meaningful activities; Walzer describes the 
plural distribution of social goods in different spheres of 
human activity; and Bourdieu focuses on power relation-
ships. When searching for a normative framework, it mat-
ters which of these approaches is being taken as the starting 
point. The theories also differ in their emphasis on a descrip-
tive (Bourdieu) versus a normative (Walzer) analysis.
This vagueness about the normative framework is a seri-
ous problem because protection of privacy in the digital 
age requires systemic criteria to measure new develop-
ments against established customs. Nissenbaum assumes at 
the start that online technologies change the way in which 
information flows, but they do not change the principles that 
guide the flow of information. The principles by which digi-
tal information flows must be derived from the institutions 
as they function in the off-line world, i.e., the background 
social institutions (Nissenbaum 2009). Consider online 
banking as an example. In the digital age, contacts between 
costumers and banks have completely changed. Impres-
sive buildings in which people previously made financial 
transactions have been partly replaced by the digital flow of 
information. But the core principles regarding the actions of 
the actors (the so called information and transmission prin-
ciples) have not changed. This implies that people working 
within the context are familiar with the sensible issues, and 
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they have the final say. The only thing that must be done is to 
translate the principles to the new situation. In case the novel 
practice results in a departure from entrenched norms, as 
Nissenbaum says, the novel practice is flagged as a breach, 
and we have prima facie evidence that contextual integrity 
has been violated (Nissenbaum 2009). Indeed, Nissenbaum 
admits that this starting point is inherently conservative, and 
she flags departures from entrenched practice as problematic 
(2009). She leaves open the possibility that completely new 
developments can lead to a revision of existing standards, 
and she gives ample guidelines about how to implement such 
a revision (Nissenbaum 2015).
Nissenbaum’s emphasis on existing practices must be 
understood in the context of a non-philosophical and non-
sociological source, e.g., the notion of reasonable expecta-
tion, which plays an important role in United States jurispru-
dence on privacy. In the conclusion of her book, Nissenbaum 
(2009) describes privacy as ‘a right to live in a world in 
which our expectations about the flow of personal informa-
tion are, for the most part, met’. Reasonable expectation was 
the core notion in the famous case of Katz versus United 
States, which laid the foundation for privacy discussions 
in the United States. Before Katz, it had already been rec-
ognized that within one’s own home, there was a justified 
expectation of privacy. Katz dealt with the kind of privacy 
situations in the public sphere that was described in the pre-
ceding paragraph. In this case, a phone call had been made 
from a public phone booth while enforcement agents used 
an external listening device to listen to the conversation. The 
Court considered this to be unjustified. The Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution protects people, but 
not places; therefore, the actions of the enforcement agents 
constituted an intrusion. Regardless of location, oral state-
ments are protected if there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. This extension of privacy was a revolutionary devel-
opment, and the notion of reasonable expectation turned out 
to work well. For instance, in cases where the distinction 
between hard-to-obtain information and information that is 
in plain view plays an important role. In many cases, how-
ever, just because information is in plain view does not mean 
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. Consider the 
situation where the police accidentally uncover illegal drugs 
concealed in an automobile. In cases like this, an appeal to 
privacy to protect criminals cannot be justified.
However, the normative strength of the notion reasonable 
expectation is weak. The notion refers to existing practices; 
reasonable is what in a society counts as reasonable. In many 
cases, this might work out well. We usually do not need 
polls to make it clear what reasonable means. Eavesdrop-
ping is despised, yet video surveillance in a taxi is generally 
accepted. Police arbitrarily invading a house is not justified; 
however, police actively working to find concealed drugs 
are justified. In times of rapid development, referring to 
existing practices to find ultimate normative justification is 
not a good strategy, for at least two reasons. First, the danger 
of rigid conservatism might be just around the corner. This 
danger was already present in Nissenbaum’s idea that stand-
ards for online intrusions of privacy must be derived from 
the offline world. In times of technological developments 
new problems make their appearance, and new technolo-
gies change the effects of existing rules. Particularly in the 
digital age, practices and normative conceptions are under 
pressure; existing frameworks cannot be used unequivocally. 
In the times of Katz, the distinction between hard-to-obtain 
information and information in plain view was based on how 
easy it was to access the information, irrespective of the type 
of information. This distinction is out-of-date in the digi-
tal age. The revolution in techniques of surveillance makes 
almost all information that is in plain view information. Any 
development in surveillance or monitoring, if communicated 
well, might be placed under the umbrella of reasonable 
expectation. Suppose a government takes highly question-
ably measures (for instance, it collects all metadata on phone 
calls) and is completely honest about doing so. The govern-
ment does not want to surprise its citizens, so it duly informs 
the public that this is how things are being done. Anyone 
who makes a phone call has the expectation that her data 
will be stored. We all know this is not simply a hypotheti-
cal example. The same pattern can be distinguished in the 
way Google and Facebook justify their practices. Thanks to 
Mark Zuckerberg’s and Eric Schmidt’s statements, Facebook 
and Google users do not have expectations about privacy. 
Ironically, the insistence on transparency, which is so often 
heard in debates on privacy, takes the sting out of the idea 
of reasonable expectation. Transparency implies that data 
streams can flow in all directions, as long as the responsible 
persons are open and honest about it (Schoonmaker 2016).
Some would suggest that the word reasonable (as 
opposed to unreasonable) has a certain normative strength. 
The word refers to standards that have a certain degree 
of plausibility and are widely shared. Again, however, in 
order to guarantee protection of privacy, we need more 
guidance about what these standards mean, for the concept 
itself does not provide this guidance. The matter is turned 
upside down when we search for normative strengths sim-
ply by referring to current practices.
The threat of conservatism in the digital age and the 
failure of the notion reasonable expectation lead us to 
the conclusion that strong anchors, which meet certain 
criteria, are needed. This is first of all apparent in the 
conservative-progressive dimension. The standards must 
be related to existing frameworks; alienation from these 
hampers acceptance. On the other hand, they shouldn’t be 
so rigid that promising new developments are impeded. 
Second, it is apparent in the general-specific dimension. 
To motivate people, they must be so general that a wide 
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range of applications is possible. Nevertheless, they should 
not be too vague; they must be specific enough to contain 
guidelines for action.
A variety of notions that describe normative standards 
accompany Nissenbaum’s reference to various philosophi-
cal and sociological sources. As far as the dimension con-
servative-progressive is concerned, she switches, on the 
one hand, between internal logic of and settled rationale 
for social systems, and she pleads, on the other hand, for 
the moral superiority of new practices (Lever 2015). Nis-
senbaum also speaks about ultimate criteria as delivered 
by the purposes and ends of the context. This description 
is too concrete in times of rapid technological develop-
ments. Today’s targets become outmoded tomorrow. Some 
more general notion is required. In a recent refinement 
of her model, Nissenbaum (2015) provides more clarity. 
For example, she mentions a few domains of cooperative 
activities that need not count as context per se. The busi-
ness model for instance does not count as context, because 
in business the core value is earning money. When eve-
rything is for sale, it is impossible to develop independ-
ent, substantive landmarks. She also makes it clear that 
a describing context as a technological system is highly 
problematic. It leads to technological determinism, and 
therefore is a petitio principi. Normative standards about 
how to deal with technological problems are derived from 
technological developments. A proper context can count 
as what she describes as a social domain. Remarkably, she 
hardly considers this notion.
The search for independent substantive landmarks might 
be guided by the expression norms and values, which Nis-
senbaum uses in her book. Norms are fixed standards. Usu-
ally they are concrete descriptions of particular things that 
must be realised or derived. Norms are necessary for guid-
ing actions, but in times of fast changes they are too rigid. 
Values, on the other hand, are very general, even though 
they are not vague. Values such as justice, responsibility, 
and efficiency are used in a wide variety of contexts. This is 
especially true for the group of values (e.g., justice, respect, 
integrity, decency) that is concerned with the way in which 
we treat other people. These values surpass the context; they 
are important in society as a whole. They are, therefore, too 
general to deliver a normative orientation for actions within 
a context. One way to solve this problem would be to rewrite 
the values in a context-specific sense. This requires orienta-
tion points that refer to characteristics of the contexts.
At the end of her book, Nissenbaum admits that her 
description of context is deficient; she acknowledges that 
further research on the concept is necessary. We suggest 
following a suggestion that Nissenbaum herself made. In a 
short paragraph in Privacy in context, she refers to Michael 
Walzer’s conception of goods as constitutive for contexts. 
It is the only notion to which she devotes a full paragraph; 
intriguingly, however, she does not elaborate on this concept 
in her later work. This notion could be very useful for mak-
ing more explicit the underlying normativeness in contexts.
The concept of substantial goods
In his famous Spheres of Justice, Walzer (1983) stresses 
that he does not include material objects of transaction 
in his definition of goods. Instead, he uses a broader and 
more abstract notion of goods. They are immaterial quali-
ties that people conceive and create in the course of their 
actions. In his book, he comments on goods such as security, 
education, health, kinship, and life. While performing an 
action, people are oriented towards goods such as these. The 
goods come into people’s minds before they come into their 
hands. Goods are, moreover, crucial for social relationships 
(Walzer 1983). The development of goods takes place in 
social contexts. For people to be able to live together, they 
must have more or less shared conceptions about the mean-
ing of vital goods. The main goal of Walzer’s book is to 
show that different spheres of actions are characterized by 
different conceptions of goods, and subsequently different 
distributions of principles. The book turned out to be a very 
important expression of an idea that became very influential 
in determining standards for professional conduct: When 
human beings closely share an orientation on good actions 
with other human beings, this leads to a proper professional 
life. Only when goods are determined is it possible to adjust 
the standards. Without going into detail, we can point to 
two lines of thought that have contributed to elucidation and 
specification of the notion good.
Both Charles Taylor and Bernard Williams have distin-
guished goods from objects of impulsive desires and wishes 
by explaining that goods have an impact on a deep level of 
motivation. Goods ‘are judged as belonging to qualitatively 
different modes of living’ (Taylor 1999). They are the ful-
filment of deeper commitments and engagements. Not the 
intensity of the desire but the sense of worth that makes 
life meaningful is characteristic of human attitudes towards 
goods. Attachment to and engagement with goods extend 
over a longer period and lead to a deeper fulfilment when 
satisfied. Goods give meaning to professional life (Williams 
1981).
For professional ethics, Alisdair MacIntyre’s contribu-
tions have been of great importance. He elaborated on a dis-
tinctive characteristic of the concept good, which profession-
als have very often used in dealing with moral dilemmas. 
In socially established cooperative activities—MacIntyre 
mentions various examples of these, such as chess, portrait-
painting, and education—people are guided by internal 
goods, which are defined as abstract qualities that are real-
ised in the course of an active life. MacIntyre distinguishes 
between internal goods and external goods such as money, 
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power, and prestige. External goods are necessary only for 
maintaining organizations and institutions, so that the kernel 
for a practice exists in realising internal goods. The distinc-
tion between internal and external goods can be made along 
two lines. First, external goods are called external as they 
also can be acquired through activities that are not restricted 
to the practice. This is true in the sense that in activities 
outside the practices money, power, and prestige play a role, 
but it is also true in the sense that within practices it is possi-
ble to acquire money, power, and prestige through dishonest 
means. In opposition to this internal goods can be acquired 
only by excelling in activities that belong to the practice. 
Secondly, external goods are always in some individual’s 
possession. The more someone has of them, the less there 
is for other people. They are always objects for competition. 
Internal goods, on the other hand, are not in short supply. 
Their achievement is good for the whole community whose 
members participate in the practice; they can be shared in 
the full sense of the word. Many people can be orientated 
towards acquiring them without being in conflict with one 
another. In fact, a common orientation strengthens the moti-
vation of each member of the community.
The differences among these authors do not invalidate 
their common focus. The distinctions they make are insight-
ful for understanding how certain kinds of activities con-
tribute to a meaningful life. We describe them under the 
heading ‘substantial goods’, which furnish us with a nor-
mative framework that can be used to evaluate activities. 
During recent decades, this line of thought has played an 
important role in public administration (Becker and Talsma 
2015), journalism (Borden 2007), business (Solomon 1992), 
healthcare (Day 2007), and science. It has been particularly 
helpful to distinguish between qualities that are related to the 
content of a work and institutional and external pressures. 
For instance, the appropriate task for a variety of professions 
that stress quantitative performance measures can be eluci-
dated using the emphasis on substantial goods; they include 
journalists working in a democracy, scientists working in 
academic institutions, and public administrators who must 
answer to higher-level management. The ultimate goal of 
their actions does not lie in complying with external stand-
ards, but in realising goods that are themselves recognized 
as being of substantive importance.
Substantial goods in Helen Nissenbaum’s model
In the application of this line of thought to Helen Nissen-
baum’s model, we make explicit the goods that are at stake 
in a context, and we take them as the starting point for 
decisions about the flow of information. This strategy can 
contribute to the solution of several problems that currently 
stand in the way of further applying Nissenbaum’s model.
A more explicit articulation of the goods at stake will be 
helpful in solving the problem of conservatism. We have 
discussed how the notion of ‘reasonable expectation’ and 
Nissenbaum’s model might evoke the reproach of someone 
with a conservative orientation to fixed standards that do not 
do justice to new developments. The notion of substantial 
goods enables us to describe activities under a normative 
perspective without being restricted to certain activities. 
The meaning of goods can be translated in various activi-
ties. New developments lead to new interpretations of the 
goods involved, which, in turn, facilitate innovation. Take, 
for instance, education. Under the umbrella of having a good 
education, a wide variety of patterns of education can be 
developed, and new trends can be incorporated.
Another advantage of elaboration of the notion of goods 
is that it contributes to a sharper context-specific meaning 
of broad, general values, such as justice, respect, and integ-
rity. These values are very important throughout society as 
a whole. But the price they have to pay for the overall appre-
ciation is that they are vague and abstract. A more precise 
meaning requires them to be applied in concrete contexts. 
This is exactly what Michael Walzer does with the value 
‘justice’ in Spheres of Justice. He shows that the criteria for 
distribution are dependent on standards that differ from one 
context to another. Likewise, a precise description of the 
meaning of the notion ‘respect’ in education (i.e. respect 
for the student or the teacher) differs from respect as under-
stood in healthcare (i.e. respect for the patient). Knowledge 
of the substantial goods at stake is helpful when it comes to 
concretizing these broad notions. And this is not simply a 
superfluous luxury in the digital age. For instance, in health-
care explicit awareness of the meaning of ‘respect’ for the 
patient helps to determine the appropriate flow of informa-
tion that benefits the patient’s health. It is, therefore, helpful 
in protecting the interests of the patient from institutional 
pressures or pressures from special interest groups.
In addition to these merits, an articulation of the substan-
tial goods delivers a welcomed intervention in an otherwise 
awkward debate about the different roles that privacy can 
play. Privacy is not exclusively positive. It can, for instance, 
be used to conceal poor practices. Hiding information is a 
central feature of deception. For instance, feminists have 
stated that privacy is the enemy of equality… placing ordi-
nary people at the mercy of powerful people (Marx 2015). 
For criminals, privacy is a cover-up for their activities. 
Relating privacy to the substantial goods it serves is helpful 
in these debates, in which privacy seems to be a double-
edged sword. When it is clear which kinds of goods privacy 
serves (e.g. goods of particular interest groups; emancipa-
tion; the common good), a context-specific discussion on the 
value of privacy is possible.
Finally, the notion of goods importantly contains a nor-
mative orientation, which is distinguished from, for instance, 
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economic imperatives. After all, commercial interests are 
increasingly hampering privacy. A stronger awareness of 
the substantial goods at stake strengthens arguments against 
commodification. This is even more important as privacy is 
increasingly encroached upon in terms of trade-offs. People 
are being seduced to choose between, for instance, more 
privacy versus more customized offers from corporations 
or more privacy versus paying a lower insurance premium. 
In such trade-offs, privacy is described as a luxury that only 
wealthy people can afford (Criado and Such 2015). How 
far can we go without spoiling what is vital for leading a 
good life? A strong articulation of substantive goods will 
be helpful placing a barrier between commercial pressures 
and leading a good life.
Conclusions
During the past decade, we have witnessed the emergence 
of the so-called social approach to privacy. This approach 
must be clearly distinguished from an autonomy approach. 
These two approaches rely on different normative frame-
works and different justification strategies. Both of them 
have their merit in the digital age. Changing technologies 
threaten autonomy, and autonomy is indispensable for mak-
ing clear what is at stake in discussions of privacy. Neglect-
ing autonomy and the processes that threaten to undermine 
it is harmful for individuals. The social approach, which has 
been an undercurrent for decades, gains importance in the 
digital age. When privacy is defined in terms of control over 
flows of information, an approach is required that surpasses 
the perspective of the individual. The right to privacy pro-
vides protection in relationships with other human beings 
and with institutions, where the fulfilment and development 
of one’s personal identity can be realised. The normative 
strength of this approach can be improved by a more explicit 
elaboration of the goods that are at stake.
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